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A B S T R A C T
Recent studies on vigilante groups show how they often begin as popular schemes
for imposing order, before degenerating into violent militias which contribute in
turn to social and political disorder. The Masai, a group of khat sellers and
consumers in the Ugandan border town of Bwera, represent a more complex
case. By using vigilance tactics in the provision of security, the Masai actually help
to shape public authority within Bwera town instead of creating institutional
chaos. They also provide a range of services, imposing a degree of order on illegal
cross-border activities in the area. However, a closer look at the Masai shows that
their vigilance activities are mainly performed out of self-interest, as a quid pro
quo enabling them to continue their illegal activities of smuggling, general
criminality outside town and illegal drug use. Therefore they straddle the ‘crime
or social order ’ dynamic, representing a criminal gang of illegal drug traﬃckers
which also provides services for public community interests. As such, they con-
tribute to both order and crime.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Public authority is not the exclusive domain of a single institution, i.e. the
government, but has become part of a process of negotiation between
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various institutions. Within this process, state institutions become frac-
tured while non-state actors become increasingly important. This paper
focuses on the negotiation between state actors and one speciﬁc non-state
actor called the Masai, a group of sellers and consumers of the stimulant
khat in the town of Bwera, on the border between western Uganda and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).1 It examines the Masai not
with regard to their consumption of khat (see Carrier 2007), but as a group
of marginalised young men playing an important role in local governance.
The Masai constitute an important actor in the local political arena, with a
pivotal role in the regulation of violence: they provide security within town
by adhering to an internal code of conduct and by tackling general
criminality. Among the inhabitants of Bwera town, there is a general
consensus that ‘without the Masai and Jamali [their leader], things would
be messy’ (Local politician 2006 int.). The Masai are therefore considered
an important, but informal, community police force. Moreover, they play
a key role in Bwera’s speciﬁc position as a border town, acting as ‘ tech-
nical assistants ’ and an ‘underworld police force’ in the cross-border trade
between Uganda and Congo.
The Masai are studied in terms of the micro-politics of vigilance, de-
ﬁned by Pratten (2006: 711) as ‘ the protection and care of the community
encompassed within these boundaries ’, which ‘ involves maintaining
surveillance and taking action against threats to this community’.
Vigilance as such is most often associated with vigilantes, but also con-
cerns ‘contests over responsibilities and functions that further blur the
boundaries of the state … Critically these tactics concern the deployment
of ‘‘ insider ’’ knowledge of procedures of the state, counter-surveillance,
and the (re)imagining and mobilization of communities and con-
stituencies ’ (ibid.). In this ethnography, vigilance is analysed in terms of
securing protection and proﬁt for the Masai themselves (with their de
facto illegal status), the town population (as the Masai control crime rates
within town), local and foreign cross-border traders (whose illegal activi-
ties they protect), and local opposition politicians (who beneﬁt from the
Masai’s political and logistical support). In this context, public authority is
formed in a constant negotiation between the Masai and diﬀerent state
actors in Bwera town. This article therefore focuses on what Lund
(2006a: 676) calls ‘ the processual aspects of the formation of public
authority, and in particular how it takes place in day-to-day social en-
counters ’.2 Through these encounters, rules and codes are established
that constitute public authority and governance in Bwera town and the
area’s cross-border trading activities, though these rules challenge tra-
ditional logic and discourses in terms of public/private and legal/illegal
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distinctions. Both state actors and the Masai must respect these rules for
the negotiation to continue.
T H E M A S A I, V I G I L A N C E A N D L O C A L P O L I T I C S
The (de)construction of order is a central theme in the study of vigilantes
and vigilance. When working well, vigilantes are praised for their general
contribution to public order by enforcing rules and penalties, deﬁned by
and adapted to local needs (Heald 2005: 266). With regard to Nigeria,
Ekeh (2002) for example argues that vigilantes clearly meet a local need for
security which cannot be fulﬁlled by the existing state police forces.
However, this is not always the case. A prominent issue in recent research
on vigilantes is why some vigilantes contribute to order and others do not:
many vigilante groups start as popular initiatives for the construction of
order, but degenerate into violent militias, contributing to social and pol-
itical disorder through brutal human rights violations and increasing
criminality and insecurity. An important question is therefore why the
Masai play a constructive role in day-to-day processes of governance and
security within Bwera town, while many similar groups play a destructive
role in perpetuating social disorder. In brief, why do vigilantes adopt what
Daniel Nina (2001, quoted in Baker 2002a, 2002b) calls ‘either a crime or
social order approach’? Most of the literature on the subject emphasises
the politically opportunistic nature of vigilante groups in explaining ap-
parently ‘ senseless violence’ (Ruteere & Pommerolle 2003: 603). Within
the context of a neo-patrimonial state under strong economic and political
pressure, vigilantes try to gain access to patronage networks of (re)distri-
bution and ‘capture’ the state. In this scenario, vigilantes ‘all too easily
become a political instrument in the hands of those with the money to pay’
(Anderson 2002: 542). In other words, vigilantes are hijacked by political
elites for their own uses, serving patrimonial interests before degenerating
into criminal and violent gangs (Baker 2002a; Heald 2005; Reno 2002) – a
view which Meagher (2007: 92) summarises as ‘ far from attempting to
reform society, vigilantes are seen as collections of thugs and marginalised
youth struggling for their share of patronage, and preying on the com-
munities they claim to protect ’. A more nuanced view is oﬀered by
Kagwanja (2003, 2006) and Meagher (2007), who emphasise the need to
look beyond research that stresses the inherently brutal character of vig-
ilante groups. This work notes the dynamic relationships between vigilante
groups and the broader institutional environment in explaining the shift
from ‘order ’ to ‘disorder ’, and in this way from the defence of public to
more private interests. Many vigilante groups were initially independent
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social movements, which contributed to local order before veering oﬀ
to become violent political and criminal organisations. Kagwanja (2006)
for example shows how Mungiki was originally a social movement that
resisted Moi’s patrimonial power, thus holding state power to account.
However, as the movement was co-opted into the ruling party’s patron–
client relationships, it was transformed into a criminal gang, which led to
its fragmentation and disintegration. These insights are useful for the
Masai in Bwera town. Firstly, they highlight how vigilantes operate on
a sliding scale, along which they can move from ‘order’ to ‘disorder ’ and
from public to more private interests. Secondly, they indicate how their
relative position is determined by these groups’ relationships in the wider
institutional environment, especially with political elites and other infor-
mal urban groups. These actors are not independent of each other, but
are what Norbert Elias (1987: 85) calls ‘ﬁgurations’ or a ‘pattern which
interdependent human beings, as groups or as individuals, form with each
other ’.3 Analysing the dynamics and power balances in this ‘ sociological
conﬁguration’ throws up insights into public authority in Bwera town and
the role of urban marginalised groups such as the Masai in the (de)con-
struction of local law and order.
M I R A A, T H E M A S A I A N D T H E S Y N A G O G I
Bwera is a small town in Kasese district in western Uganda, right on the
border with the DRC. Because of its strategic location, it has a thriving
informal economy. An important group within this informal economy are
the Masai, who sell and consume miraa. ‘Miraa’ and ‘mairungi ’ are the
local names for the stimulant khat (qat). Miraa has been grown in Uganda
since the early twentieth century, coming to Bwera ﬁfty years later, when
Arab traders settled in the area. These traders started consuming miraa
and cultivating it on a small scale. Miraa was and continues to be imported
from larger plantations in the neighbouring town of Fort Portal, where
conditions are much more favourable for its cultivation (Anderson et al.
2007 : 122). Many people – in the ﬁrst place fellow Muslims – also took up
the habit. At ﬁrst mainly conﬁned to businessmen, it quickly spread to the
youth.
Within Bwera town, people associated with miraa are divided into two
categories, sellers and consumers. There are only between eight and
twelve sellers. Every day, they go to Kasese town (about one hour’s drive
away), where they buy the khat from Fort Portal, and transport it to
Bwera. The consumers are a much bigger group. There are no estimates
of their total number, but there is a rather stable group of about a hundred
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people hanging around the ‘Synagogi ’, a run-down structure in a dark
corner of the central market of Bwera and the main location where miraa
is sold and consumed. Apart from this, there is a much larger group of
about 1,000 consumers who occasionally sit in the Synagogi when buying
their miraa. Members of the Synagogi – both sellers and consumers – are
called the Masai. There are no formal mechanisms to become a Masai :
anyone consuming miraa in the Synagogi is considered a Masai. On
average, the Masai are a group of uneducated and largely unemployed
men who have few job prospects beyond petty work in the transport sector
such as loading and oﬄoading vehicles. Apart from these men, about ten
women are members of the ‘core group’ and work as prostitutes. The
group reﬂects the ethnic composition of the town: 80% of the Masai are
Bakonzo. The remaining 20% are a mixture of diﬀerent ethnic groups:
Batooro, Banyankole, Baganda, Nande and so on. The members of the
core group are mostly between ﬁfteen and twenty-ﬁve years old, except
for a few leading members, who are between thirty and ﬁfty. The ‘wider’
Masai group is a very broad age group, ranging from ﬁfteen to sixty
years old.
There are two versions circulating among the Masai as to why they
chose their particular name. The ﬁrst version claims it was adopted from
the ‘original ’ Kenyan Masai who are known as traders in herbal products
in the area. The Bwera Masai decided to take their name because they
also deal in what they consider ‘healing herbal products ’, miraa. The
second version claims that they chose the name for socio-political reasons,
as the Kenyan Masai resisted colonial power. As will be explained, the
Masai in Bwera also consider themselves as standing up against oppressive
powers.
The name Synagogi mirrors their socio-political identiﬁcation in a
similar way. As one of the leading members summarises : ‘The Synagogi is
the church of the Judas, the church of the bad people. During the time of
Jesus, Judas was opposed to Jesus ’ (Leading Masai member 2008 int.). As
with the name Masai, they chose the term Synagogi because they feel
marginalised and are resisting what they consider oppressive powers.
The Masai have a centralised hierarchical structure, based around their
leader Jamali, a primary school drop-out who has been dealing in miraa
for over twenty years. Apart from his experience in the miraa business, a
particular characteristic of Jamali which is important for his leadership
position is his ‘ fearlessness ’. He has quite an aggressive personality4 and is
known for confronting anyone whom he dislikes, regardless of whether
they are street sellers or high-placed government representatives. On
several occasions, he has jumped in front of ministerial cars in order to
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demand something. Everyone, both within and outside of the association,
emphasises how he ‘ fears nothing and no one’ (Local trader 1 2005 int.).
This status allows him to control all decisions within the association,
whether related to the Masai’s vigilance or trading activities : everything
passes through him. In other words, Jamali’s leadership is based on a
mixture of respect and fear. There is no formalised hierarchy, but mem-
bers who are closer to Jamali have an (informally) higher hierarchical
position. So do members who have been in the association for a longer
time: the younger members have to show great respect for the elders.
Disrespect for this strict hierarchical order leads to punishment.5 The
Masai leadership is respected not only by the Masai themselves, but also
by other groups within the informal economy of Bwera town: boda boda
(motorcycle and bicycle taxi) drivers, fuel smugglers, street sellers and
so on. The Masai leaders, and particularly Jamali, have close links to all
major government ﬁgures in the area (civil servants, local politicians,
security agencies and so on), with whom they are in contact on a regular
basis, and for whom they serve as an entry-point into the informal sphere
of Bwera town. This also works the other way around: the Masai serve as
an entry-point for the population to the government agents. As will be
explained later, the Masai act as go-betweens between governmental
agents/politicians and the other urban informal groups, which have
neither contacts nor a strict organisational unity.
M I R A A: (I L)L E G A L S U B S T A N C E I N U G A N D A
Miraa has an ambiguous legal position: while legal in some countries (such
as Kenya, South Africa and the UK), it is illegal in many others (such as
Somalia, USA, Canada and several European countries). Miraa is legal in
Uganda, where it is cultivated and consumed by a growing number of
people, especially youths. Despite its legal status, there are plans on the
national level to ban its sale and use: although not ratiﬁed by the Ugandan
parliament, there is a new bill to restrict trade and production (Anderson
et al. 2007 : 124). According to Beckerleg (2006: 227), ‘across the country,
opinion is sharply divided amongst political leaders, health oﬃcials, as well
as khat producers, sellers, and consumers as to whether a national ban on
khat will come into eﬀect. ’ Media reports frequently stress the illegal
character of the stimulant. The pro-government newspaper New Vision has
often portrayed khat as a harmful narcotic (Anderson et al. 2007 : 130–1 ;
Beckerleg 2006: 228–9).
Most people in Uganda are unaware of the legal status of miraa, and
regard it as an illegal substance similar to ‘opium’ or banja, the local names
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for cannabis.6 This image is enhanced by the fact that many consumers
smoke cannabis after chewing khat, as is also the case in Bwera, where
cannabis is consumed and sold in the Synagogi. Miraa is not only con-
sidered illegal because of its links with other narcotic substances, but is also
associated with idleness, crime, addiction, immoral sexual behaviour,
family breakdown and school absenteeism.
These views are mirrored by local government authorities, which are
increasingly trying to limit the use of miraa within their scope of jurisdic-
tion. As a local government oﬃcial in Bwera (2006 int.) said:
Here, the local government has argued that in many cases these boys do not
sleep after taking mairungi, and during the night they get involved in things like
gambling and crime … Because when they are taking, they can lose senses ; so
they are a potential danger : they have to be arrested and taken to prison.
The oﬃcer in charge of Bwera police station (2006 int.) on the other hand
argued that :
Mairungi is not in the books of law, not enacted by law, not gazetted by
government. There is no clear regulation: for a long time, we have tried to consult
the government on a regulation, but they don’t give any regulation ! So we just
leave them; and we arrest them on the pretext of idle and disorderly.
As a result, the local government authorities in Kasese (district council)
and Bwera (sub-county council) have passed by-laws restricting the miraa
trade.
Although local government authorities formally treat their activities as
illegal, the Masai are nevertheless allowed to continue these activities : the
by-laws on miraa are not strictly followed up. This has partly to do with
the fact that the Masai ‘ share their spoils ’ with the security agencies : the
oﬃcer in charge (OC) of the local police gains his share from the sale of
khat (a ﬁxed percentage which was impossible to discover) ; and other
security oﬃcers (police agents, local defence units, special police constables
and so on) accept petty bribes whenever raids take place – on average
UGX 10,000 (US $6.1). If Masai are arrested, negotiation is still possible at
the police station. Normally, the police oﬃcers charge a (rather high) bribe
of UGX 50,000 (US $30.5) per person, which most Masai try to pay.
Paying a bribe to the police is seen as more ‘reasonable ’ than being sent to
court, where bribing is not possible,7 and where they are charged with
idleness and abuse of alcohol and other drugs (but not miraa), which can
result in a prison sentence.
The ﬁnancial incentives for the security agencies however oﬀer only a
partial explanation as to why the Masai group is still allowed to continue
its activities (chewing, selling, taking other drugs) in town. This paper
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argues that the main reasons why they are allowed to continue their
activities are, ﬁrstly, their role in preventing criminal aﬀairs within Bwera
town and, secondly, their major role in the political sphere.
T H E M A S A I A N D S O L V I N G C R I M I N A L A F F A I R S
Key to understanding the role of the Masai as a vigilante group is the fact
that there was a large group of unemployed, uneducated and landless
people in Bwera, which led to increased insecurity within the town.
A crucial event in this was the insurgency of the ADF or Allied Democratic
Forces. The ADF was formed by remnants of a series of movements : the
Tabliq8 (who had ﬂed to westernUganda after imprisonment), theNational
Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and the Rwenzururu move-
ment. The last two were based in the Ruwenzori Mountains on the border
between Congo and Uganda. This became the ADF’s area of operation,
from where it waged an insurgency against the Ugandan government
between 1997 and 2000, in which large parts of the population were
displaced through the use of random terror.9Themovement had little local
support, but wasmainly based in the area because of its strategic location: a
mountainous area on the border with theDRC. The ADF received support
from the Sudanese government and Mobutu’s Zaı¨re – and, according to
some sources, from Al Qaeda and other radical Islamists (Hovil & Werker
2005). By 2000, the movement was largely defeated and had retreated to
their camps in the DRC, where they remain to this day.
Although the Masai already existed some time before the ADF
insurgency, it was around this period that they gained importance as
a vigilante group: the insurgency had created an explosive situation with a
heightened degree of conﬂict and a corresponding need for vigilante and
informal justice mechanisms within Bwera town. Much of this had to do
with the inﬂux of refugees into Bwera. With over 30,500 displaced persons
at the height of the conﬂict, almost doubling the sub-county population of
38,000 inhabitants, Bwera was the worst-hit among the diﬀerent sub-
counties of Kasese district.10 Although ADF units were either wiped out or
pushed back into the DRC by late 2002, people strongly suspected that
remnants were still active in the Ruwenzori Mountains.11 As a result,
many people have never returned to their homes in the mountains but
instead chose to remain in town. There has also been an inﬂux of
Congolese refugees throughout the years. Meanwhile the high land pre-
ssure in Kasese district12 and the decline of traditional cash crops (cotton
and coﬀee) had already caused a large group of unemployed, landless and
often uneducated people to move to Bwera town in search of employment.
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On top of this, many parents were no longer able to send their children to
school during and after the insurgency, through which many children
(especially adolescents) ended up on the streets, consuming drugs such as
khat or cannabis. This led to a volatile situation which resulted in higher
rates of conﬂict and criminality, in particular theft and rape. The existing
police agencies were not equipped (in terms of materials and manpower)
to deal with this new situation of higher population and crime levels.
Moreover, many of the oﬀences have a cross-border nature, as criminals
often cross the border to Congo, which is only 2 kilometres from Bwera
town. The next section argues how, unlike the existing security agencies,
the Masai proved instrumental in controlling crime levels within town.
The Masai are very much a product of this social context of Bwera
town, as they are a group of uneducated, landless ‘rough and dangerous’
young men who take illegal drugs and are considered very prone to
criminality. As Beckerleg argues (2006: 238–9) :
All over the world, drug use is linked to criminality : dealing in illicit substances is
a crime in itself ; drug users often turn to crime to raise money for their substance
of choice … Ugandan khat traders and consumers argue that this one substance
is being singled out as a cause of crime and that unruly, violent youth usually mix
alcohol and cannabis with khat.
The latter phrase is nevertheless a good description of the Masai, wild
youth for whom miraa is their ‘core business ’, but who also consume and
sell other drugs, such as cannabis, fuel fumes and (more hidden) cocaine.
This further contributes to their dangerous and violent image: the Masai
are seen locally as bayaya (stubborn and dangerous people) who can easily
be drawn into criminal aﬀairs.
Although the Masai are a dangerous and potentially criminal group,
their engagement in criminal aﬀairs within the town would disturb the
fragile equilibrium in which they are allowed to continue their activities.
In particular, the general image of the illegality of miraa has a profound
impact on the ways in which they conduct their activities : the Masai
regard their own activities as illegal and so conduct them with relative
caution and discretion, in order to protect and continue them.13 Most
important, they have an elaborate code of conduct and play a major role in
curbing crime in town: misbehaviour among the members within town is
not tolerated, and they have been eﬀective in tackling increased urban
criminality. A senior security oﬃcer of the district summarises : ‘They
take punitive measures towards their members to protect themselves ! ’
(District security oﬃcer 2006 int.). Moreover, as the majority of the Masai
members originate from Bwera/Kasese, there is a strong feeling among
the Masai that ‘we cannot make mistakes here in town. If we do, we have
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no other place to go’ (Masai member 2 2006 int.). This fundamental
paradox, in which the Masai are considered a threat to local order, but on
the other hand constitute a localised struggle against criminalisation
and disorder, is at the core of understanding the conduct of the Masai
and the local authorities in Bwera town. The Masai, for example, proved
instrumental in bringing down the high levels of urban criminality during
the major inﬂux of IDPs in Bwera town during the ADF insurgency. In
case of theft or criminal oﬀences, they are preferred to the police, as they
are seen as more eﬃcient and less corrupt.
They are eﬀective for several reasons. Firstly, they seek to control crime
within the Masai association. As the Masai are a group at the margins of
society, considered ‘rough and dangerous’ with little employment and
education, it is obvious that they are highly vulnerable to involvement in
criminal aﬀairs. However, through their hierarchical and united structure,
they have a code of conduct that enforces respect and discipline within
their association. If a member has committed a crime, the Masai sit
together to decide what action to take against that member. These con-
sultations are led by their leader Jamali and the ‘upper layer ’ of the elder
Masai, but any other Masai are free to join. If found guilty, the member
may receive corporal punishment or be expelled from the association. If
the police want to arrest a member, the Masai organise a similar con-
sultation with diﬀerent possible outcomes: the group can either prevent
arrest and punish the member themselves ; or resist arrest because the
Masai are convinced of the member’s innocence. About one third of
the Masai are former security operatives (ex-vigilantes, local defence units,
special police constables, soldiers and so on) – they are therefore con-
sidered violent and dangerous men who know how to use weapons, and
are also feared by the police – ‘Because they can strangle you to death! ’
(Police security oﬃcer 2006 int.). Moreover, through their close contact
with other urban informal groups (such as fuel smugglers, boda boda drivers
and prostitutes), they can swiftly raise chaos in town in protest at decisions
made by the government authorities or security agencies. Therefore, if the
Masai decide somebody should not be arrested, it simply does not happen
in the majority of the cases – even if security agencies come with force.
The Masai can nevertheless decide to hand over the member to the police
and expel him from the association. This happens when the member has
failed to respect the internal rules of the Masai through misconduct in
Bwera town (such as theft), or when he has neglected the rules in the
internal Masai sphere, for example by showing disrespect to the leader-
ship. A good illustration was an event during the ﬁeld research in which
traders in cosmetic products, staying in a hotel in Bwera town, had most of
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their products stolen from their van by some of the Masai boys. The owner
of the hotel contacted the Masai, which quickly found out which boys had
broken into the vehicle. The boys were arrested by the group, beaten
severely, and the property was recovered. There was therefore no reason
to take the case to the police. Other cases involved similar scenarios, in
which boys ‘had overtaken drugs and broken into people’s home; and
they were caned seriously ! They are not allowed to do this in town!’
(Local trader 1 2005 int.).
Secondly, the Masai’s organisational structure often acts as an informal
tribunal for solving conﬂicts, as other urban informal groups use the
association for solving their criminal and domestic cases.14 If a member of
any of these groups such as the ‘Khadaﬁs ’ (fuel smugglers) or the boda boda
taxi drivers break their respective codes of conduct, they are most often
brought to the Masai. The ‘Khadaﬁs’ for example use the Masai when
one of them has stolen fuel from one of his colleagues or in cases of
domestic violence. As these groups have no strict organisational structure
(they have no pressing need to control their members), and as the higher-
level Masai are much respected within town, they rely on the Masai’s
judgements for resolving conﬂicts.15 According to the Masai, certain minor
cases such as domestic conﬂicts are sometimes even referred to them by
the police.16
Thirdly, through their central geographical location in town and their
social position at the axis of many networks, they access many people and
are always aware of what is happening in town. For example, their leader
Jamali is closely related to the various branches of government such as
local councils, security agents, judiciary and so on. These governmental
agents use him to approach actors within the urban informal sphere, and
vice versa. Moreover, the Masai have many contacts within the ‘under-
world’ of Kasese and the wider (cross-border) region. This is due partly
to their involvement in the drug trade, but also to the fact that many
thieves belonged to the Masai at some stage. So when a criminal oﬀence
occurs, the Masai are able to quickly approach their informants. Through
these contacts, they proved crucial in tracing ADF recruitment among
the Salaf-Tabliq sect in Bwera and Kasese. They found recruitment
pamphlets, passed information to local security agents and identiﬁed the
leaders. In sum, contacts with these other groups are both class-inspired
(‘underworld lumpen’) and instrumental, i.e. the Masai perform useful
functions for all these other groups, so the other groups cooperate with
them.17
Fourthly, because of the miraa chewing, the Masai are always awake
late into the night. As many crimes happen during these hours, they can
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be swiftly approached for help. On numerous occasions, thefts occurred at
night, after which the victims went to the Synagogi, and the Masai were
called upon as an intervening force.
Lastly, they are considered ‘dangerous and stubborn’, and according to
a police oﬃcer (2006 int.) ‘as a group unbeatable ’ : while they are already
diﬃcult to handle as individuals, when acting as a group it is impossible to
resist their power. Much of their strength lies in their unity. This is again
related to their centralised hierarchical structure, in which Jamali has a
high degree of control over the organisation. All the above functions
happen strictly through him: consultations within the association, with
other groups, their vigilance activities and so on. This makes them
extremely eﬀective in the use of physical strength. As a Masai member
(Masai member 1 2006 int.) argues : ‘At times the thieves do beat the
policeman; but he cannot beat a gang of us. The police is always one; we
are always many. ’ If a thief is caught, he is either punished by the Masai,
or taken to the police. Punishment by the Masai is seen as ‘more eﬀective ’
than the police: whereas one can easily bribe the police to escape pun-
ishment, there is no escape from the corporal punishment of the Masai
(strokes of the cane and other beatings).
T H E M A S A I A N D B W E R A A S A B O R D E R T O W N
The role of the Masai is closely related to the position of Bwera, on the
border with the DRC, next to the important Congolese border market of
Kasindi. Together with Aru, Kasindi is the main border market on the
Ugandan–Congolese border ( Johnson & Tegera 2007; Raeymaekers
2007; Titeca in prep.), and historically has been an important trading post
for the distribution of goods into eastern Congo. These goods originate
from places such as Dubai, Hong Kong or China and arrive in the port of
Mombasa, from where they are transported to the Kenyan–Ugandan
border town of Busia, pass through Uganda, and ﬁnally arrive in Kasindi.
From Kasindi onwards, goods are not only distributed into eastern Congo,
but also smuggled back into Uganda, and more speciﬁcally to Bwera. This
allows traders to dodge Ugandan taxes, as goods on transit to the DRC
(Kasindi) are exempt from Ugandan taxes. From Bwera, goods are dis-
tributed back into south-western and central Uganda. The most popular
smuggled goods are batteries, lotions, cigarettes, kithenke (women’s fabrics),
motorcycles and fuel. Bwera town has therefore grown in parallel to the
border market of Kasindi : it is the last Ugandan stop before Kasindi, and
the main distribution point for goods smuggled from Kasindi. Bwera’s
economy is therefore closely connected to that of Kasindi. Most of the
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population of Bwera is involved in cross-border trade, and many farmers
also sell their goods in Kasindi.
The Masai also developed in response to the location of Bwera in the
regional cross-border economy. Much of the cross-border trade occurs
with varying degrees of illegality ; and as already noted, Bwera functions as
a major dispatching point for the (re)distribution of goods to Uganda. The
Masai are useful for smugglers in two ways. Firstly, as an ‘underworld
police force’ ; and secondly, as ‘ technical assistants for the smugglers ’ :
transporters, informers and so on.
Traders who smuggle goods across the border are acting strictly outside
the legal framework, and cannot therefore resort to the protection of state
agencies (police, army and so on) if anything goes wrong. On the contrary,
since the trade is illegal, everyone involved is liable to prosecution. As
Gambetta (1993: 226) argues, this has many consequences :
illegal assets are vulnerable to lawful seizure as well as to theft ; property
rights cannot rely on written records and are generally poorly deﬁned; liability is
restricted to the physical person; individual mobility is greater ; and agents
are tougher, more prone to risk, and more secretive than their law-abiding
counterpart.
Vigilante groups characteristically emerge when the police fail to protect
citizens (Anderson 2002; Baker 2002a; Buur 2006; Heald 1986; Meagher
2007). In the case of smuggling, the state does not fail to protect, but is
simply not allowed to protect the actors and their property. If something
goes wrong, there is no court to which these smugglers can appeal. This is
where the Masai step in: the protection of the private property of the
smugglers is one of the most important services which the Masai ‘produce,
promote and sell ’ (Mutongi 2006: 559), similar to the Maﬁa in diﬀerent
parts of the world (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001). A smuggler whose goods
are stolen cannot resort to the police, but he can resort to the Masai, who
act as an ‘alternative police force’. For example, during the period of ﬁeld
research the goods of one smuggler (dry cell batteries) had been stolen by his
transporters. The trader therefore contacted the Masai, who started their
own investigations and eventually recovered the goods, for which they were
given a ﬁnancial reward of about UGX 20,000.
In this context, the Masai information network is not limited to Bwera
town. On the one hand, they are well connected with the Congolese side of
the border, which allows them to solve cross-border crimes. Much of this
has to do with the fact that the same ethnic group lives on both sides of the
border, but was divided by colonialism – the Bakanzo on the Ugandan side
and the Nande on the Congolese side. Many people have family on both
sides of the border, and so do the Masai. For example, their leader Jamali
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comes from a polygamous familial background, and his father had two
wives on the Congolese side of the border. Through this family connection,
Jamali has many contacts on the Congolese side. On top of this, the Masai
frequently interact with the ‘underworld’ of the Congolese border zone, for
example by selling miraa to them. In this situation, the Masai are very
eﬀective in solving cross-border crimes: they are not only able to trace
stolen smuggled goods, but can solve general cross-border crimes in
the area. Whenever theft occurs, the culprits most often quickly cross the
nearby border to the DRC. Whereas the police are not very successful
in solving these ‘cross-border crimes’, the elaborate Masai trans-border
network proves far more eﬀective than either the Ugandan or Congolese
police. The Masai are often consulted by the police to solve such crimes.
The Masai are similarly well connected with Busia, the entry point for
goods into Uganda from Kenya. In this way, their information network
extends across the whole chain of the cross-border trade, which allows
them to intervene in case of any problem. The connection with Busia
started with individual Masai accompanying Congolese traders to Busia ;
soon afterwards a number of them began working in Busia. There are
about ﬁfty Masai working in Busia, doing petty jobs such as loading and
oﬄoading. The Masai in Busia do not form a single group as in Bwera, but
there is a clear connection with the Masai in Bwera: in case of diﬃculties
along the trading chain, they are asked for help. Similarly, Masai who
have to leave Bwera because they have misbehaved and/or are hunted by
the police are transferred to Busia by the leadership. In Busia, Congolese
traders prefer working with Masai rather than with local people, simply
because the Masai speak the same language as the Congolese traders, as
they belong to the same ethnic group.
The second important function of the Masai is as ‘ technical assistants ’
of the smugglers. As explained above, the Masai are at the centre of much
of the information in Bwera town: they are aware of everything that
happens and particularly of anything to do with security. They know
about all the operations of all the anti-smuggling agencies (the Special
Revenue Protection Services, mobile police, army and so on). This makes
them excellent associates for the smugglers : they are not only able to
inform them about the movements of the anti-smuggling agencies, but are
also used to transport smuggled goods across the border.
P R O T E C T I O N A S A ‘D O U B L E-E D G E D S W O R D’
The above sections have described how the Masai play positive roles in the
governance of Bwera town and in the cross-border trading networks : they
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protect the inhabitants of Bwera and the actors in the cross-border trade.
This does not mean that this form of community policing is necessarily
better than state policing. The danger of protection in this situation is
well described by Charles Tilly (1990 in Raeymaekers 2007: 119–20), who
argues that protection can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it
resembles shelter provided by a powerful friend, yet on the other hand
it evokes a racket in which a local strongman forces people to pay tribute
in order to avoid damage, mainly inﬂicted by himself. Once problems
are encountered with this ‘powerful friend/local strongman’, there is
nowhere else to turn. This is also the case for clients of the Masai com-
munity policing practices. Once people disagree with the Masai, they
cannot challenge them or complain to the police or any other authorities,
as the Masai and their informal judgements are part of the ‘negotiated
reality ’ between both sides. This process is ﬁrmly outside the legal sphere,
and unavoidably breaches people’s legal and constitutional rights.
Although no examples of such cases were discovered, this diminished ac-
countability (Baker 2002a) is a serious downside to the Masai’s community
justice strategy.
Another major problem with the vigilante tactics of the Masai is that,
although this code of conduct is enforced and eﬀective in preventing crime
within Bwera town, the Masai remain engaged in criminal activities outside
town. It is a basic rule that a Masai member is punished if he commits a
crime in Bwera town, but is allowed to commit thefts across the border or
a reasonable distance outside Bwera town. As a Masai member (Masai
member 3 2006 int.) summarises :
If you’re a person known as breaking into people’s houses around here [Bwera
town], we give you a bad beating ! Or we push you out of the association. But if
you do it far away, it is no problem. Because we want to maintain the relationship
with the people here. We want to keep a good relationship with the area here.
For crimes committed outside town, things are much more unpredict-
able, as there are no clear rules of conduct for them. Much depends on
the speciﬁc negotiation on the issue: sometimes it is possible to recover
(part of) the goods, sometimes not. For example, on one occasion during
the ﬁeld research a Masai boy was oﬄoading dried ﬁsh for a trader
across the border; but he managed to steal the trader’s money – some
UGX 3 million (US $1831.5). When the trader realised his money was
stolen, he asked the Masai to assist him in retrieving it. The other Masai
members however informed the Local Defence Units (LDUs) about the
boy’s theft ; after which the LDUs came to arrest him. The LDUs and the
Masai boy came to an agreement in which part of the money was shared
between them, and part of the money returned to the owner. In other
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cases, the thieves and the Masai share the spoils among themselves. It can
therefore be argued that, in a rather cynical way, much of the Masai’s
eﬀectiveness in solving cross-border crimes is a result of their engagement
in the criminal sphere outside town. In a similar way, it can be argued that
crime is simply pushed outside the urban centre of Bwera, and that the
reduction of crime within town may be proportional to increased crimi-
nality outside it. In brief, the Masai not only help to ﬁnd criminals in
Bwera town, but are engaged in criminality themselves outside town.
What does this tell us about the nature of the association? This is discussed
in the next section.
V I G I L A N T E O R C R I M I N A L ‘G A N G’?
It should now be clear that the Masai’s activities in community protection
arise not out of altruism, but rather out of self-interest, in order to preserve
their activities and organisation: the Masai feel they have to ‘behave’ in
order to continue their illegal activities of khat and marijuana. Secondly, it
is clear that their activities, especially their involvement in crime outside
town, have a number of negative eﬀects. This brings us to a major ques-
tion: though the Masai’s engagement in community protection within
Bwera, can they really be called vigilantes? Are they not just a criminal
‘gang’? In other words, are they acting in the interest of the community or
for their own private interest? Their activities in the protection of smug-
gled goods prove insightful on this. On the one hand, this protection of
smuggled goods can also be seen as a vigilante activity in response to a
popular need by the community: vigilantes come into being to counter
activities which are destructive for the local community, but which are not
covered by the penal code. Buur (2006) for example shows this with regard
to witchcraft, which is considered criminal by the community, but is not
covered by the penal code. This ‘popular demand’ can be met not only by
a vigilante, but also by a criminal ‘gang’. The raison d’eˆtre of organised
crime is strikingly similar to that of vigilantes : ‘providing protection when
the state does not ’. Skaperdas (2001) identiﬁes similar reasons why a
criminal organisation comes into being, one of them being the prohibition
of certain goods: the illegal nature of goods creates a power vacuum
around them (for example with regard to the enforcement of property
rights), which is ﬁlled by criminal organisations. The principal diﬀerence is
that, for organised crime, protection is an economic commodity, i.e. the
ﬁnal goal is private ﬁnancial gain rather than the protection of the com-
munity as such. Another diﬀerence is that the criminal organisation plays
a major role in creating the demand: they respond to popular demand,
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but will make sure the demand is there, for example by threatening non-
payers and consumers. In other words, organised criminals are often en-
gaged in extortion: they oﬀer protection, but they are the ones you have to
be protected against (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001).
It has been shown above how crimes committed in Bwera defy
traditional legal classiﬁcations. Theft of smuggled goods by transporters is
considered criminal by the community but is not covered by legal penal
codes, and this is where the Masai oﬀer their services. In other words, they
counter activities which contribute to community disorder ; a community
in which the vast majority is engaged in the ‘ illegal ’ – yet perceived
legitimate – activities of cross-border trade. Yet, similar to criminal organ-
isations, the Masai try to push out of business traders who do not make use
of their services : they use several tactics against people who do not want to
buy their ‘product ’ of protection, in order to increase their market share
(Gambetta 1993). As they are at the axis of most of the information in the
cross-border area, they know who is crossing the border without them.
The most common way to ‘punish’ these traders is by informing the
Uganda Revenue Authorities (URA): traders who are not using their
services for smuggling goods are disclosed to the URA. In other words, the
Masai are engaged in extortion of some kind: they make sure the demand
is there, by creating the demand themselves. This has two advantages for
the Masai : ﬁrstly, it forces smugglers to work with them; and secondly,
it gives them direct ﬁnancial proﬁt – informers are given 20% of the re-
covered taxes.18 The Masai’s activities in providing protection for smug-
glers can therefore be considered organised criminality rather than
vigilante activities, as they are inspired by private ﬁnancial gain rather
than responding to community demands. In other words, they contribute
to order in the cross-border trading networks, but at a cost : you are forced
to buy their services, or you face much higher costs, which may result in
the loss of your goods. Lastly, the Masai are engaged in criminal activities
of a diﬀerent kind: theft outside town, where they are known as particu-
larly dangerous thieves and criminals.
All this suggests that they are a criminal organisation rather than a
vigilante group. They use vigilance tactics within town, but are not vig-
ilantes per se. They can be considered a criminal organisation which uses
vigilante tactics as a self-preservation measure in order to allow their
smuggling and general criminal activities, and the consumption and trade
of de facto and de jure illegal drugs (respectively miraa and marijuana).
This analysis makes it even more puzzling why the Masai are tolerated
in Bwera: they are engaged in a range of criminal activities, yet they are
freely allowed to stay in town, and engage in a range of criminal activities.
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The authorities must be aware of this, yet they allow these activities
to continue. The next section argues that their central role in the local
political sphere is crucial in explaining this.
T H E M A S A I A N D T H E L O C A L P O L I T I C A L S P H E R E: ‘M Y L I F E I S
P O L I T I C S A N D M A I R U N G I!’19
The Masai see their situation as one of complete marginalisation, as a
direct result of the neglect and failure of the government : they are har-
assed by the security forces and the government is unable to provide them
and the majority of the population with employment. Moreover, the
government has been unable to provide security during past and more
recent ADF insurgencies. The Masai have therefore historically always
supported the opposition forces in the district, and strongly consider
themselves ‘marginalized critics of corrupt rulers ’ (Reno 2002: 838). As
argued in the introduction, these feelings are also reﬂected in their names:
like the Kenyan Masai and the Biblical Synagogi, they are resisting
dominant powers. The introductory quote of Jamali, the leader of the
Masai, illustrates how they act as political agents for opposition politicians
during electoral campaigns and have strong political inﬂuence, both up-
wards towards politicians, and downwards among the wider population.
Although elements of other informal groups, such as the boda boda drivers,
have been co-opted by government politicians, the Masai have consist-
ently favoured the opposition. Government politicians who actively sup-
port them are not boycotted, but nor is this support reciprocated. Those
(government) politicians who do not support or who actively disturb them
are harassed by the Masai. They are for example notorious for throwing
litter at certain government politicians from whom they have never re-
ceived assistance or whom they suspect of having ordered their arrests.
The Masai’s political importance has several reasons, many of which
concern their increased vigilance during electoral periods. Firstly, Bwera
has a very dense political circle, rife with accusations and counter-
accusations of fraudulent behaviour. On the one hand, pro-government
supporters are a minority in the area and complain about being socially
ostracised. On the other hand, opposition supporters complain about
continuous intimidation and violence by security agencies, and the use of
these agencies for fraudulent electoral practices. Most importantly, op-
position supporters fear openly disclosing their political side – something
which clearly manifested itself during the author’s research on the local
political situation, as most of them refused to openly discuss politics,
fearing retaliation by security agencies. The Masai are diﬀerent from
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this : as ‘ stubborn and fearless ’ people, they do not fear political intimi-
dation and hence are not afraid to reveal their political aﬃliation. They
are therefore important campaigning agents for opposition politicians
during election campaigns for the opposition. Moreover, through their
many connections with governmental security agencies, the Masai can
make a risk-assessment of events organised by the opposition. This de-
tailed ‘ insider ’ knowledge of the state bureaucracies not only increases
their legitimacy among the wider population, but also makes them valu-
able political agents for opposition forces, informed about possible actions
against the latter, for example if meetings will be interrupted by the se-
curity agencies. In this sense, they act as a (non-governmental) protection
force for opposition politicians.
Secondly, the Masai have strong political inﬂuence among marginalised
urban groups such as boys working in the transport sector, street sellers,
fuel smugglers, sex workers, miraa and cannabis consumers and so on.
These marginalised groups constitute a large majority of the population in
Bwera town, and therefore play an important role in the election process.
As a local security oﬃcer (2006 int.) comments :
They [the Masai] inﬂuence trends ; very big trends. They interact with sex
workers ; boda bodas; mairungi, anyone. And all of them interact very much with
the public. And a poverty stricken public can easily be taken into anything … All
of them are a political voice which you can’t ignore ! Your political agents must go
there if you want to get elected !
Their political inﬂuence and legitimacy is linked to a number of factors :
their role as vigilantes in curbing crime and informal justice, in connecting
youth with opportunities for informal employment, but in particular
in protecting other marginalised urban groups, which in turn has to
do with their position as a ‘ fearless ’ group with many connections with
government agencies. For example, whenever tax collection is taking
place, the Masai discover the details of this collection, and report these
to other informal associations in town. If law enforcement oﬃcers still
unexpectedly come to grab goods by force from street traders refusing to
pay tax, the Masai act as a protective force for these traders.
The Masai inﬂuence not only marginalised urban groups with whom
they closely cooperate, but also the wider population within Bwera town.
Through their central location and their service provision (a variety of
people come to buy miraa), they reach large numbers of people. As a
major politician comments: ‘People respect these youth. Virtually every-
one is emotionally attached to them. People understand them: these are
youth struggling for employment ; and there is so little employment in the
area! ’ (Local politician 2006 int.) This respect is also connected to their
V I G I L A NC E AND CR IM I N A L I T Y I N UGANDA 309
role as vigilantes. As Smith (2004: 438) argues, vigilantes have a symbolic
‘ superhero status ’ which legitimises their actions and ensures widespread
popular support. As a result of this respected status in the local political
imagination, politicians regard them as ‘opinion setters ’ (Local politician
2006 int.) and ‘centre points ’ (Local trader 2 2006 int.). The Masai regard
themselves as political kingmakers ‘because we interact with so many
people and we know so many secrets no one else knows in town’ (Masai
leader Jamali 2006 int.). In this situation, and as mentioned earlier, the
Masai act as politicians’ campaigning agents – not only for reasons of se-
curity, but also because they are seen as important actors in ‘morale
boosting’, as people with ‘convincing tongues’ (Motorcycle taxi driver
2006 int.) who can easily convince people who to vote for. In brief, in their
role as opinion leaders and representatives of marginalised urban groups,
they can be considered important representatives of civil society within
Bwera town – although such associations are considered the ‘uncool ’
(Comaroﬀ & Comaroﬀ 2000: 22) side of African civil society.20
In return for the political support of the Masai, politicians negotiate
with the local government about their status : they lobby security agencies
and councils to ensure that the Masai are allowed to continue their ac-
tivities of selling and chewing miraa. As a senior security oﬃcer of Kasese
district (2006 int.) summarises the situation:
The frequent politicking is the reason why they are so many. They are a very big
constituency who vote ! The LCII, LCIII [local government representatives] ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to enforce the law, because you lose votes ! Because you arrest a guy
who has 10 family members and many more friends who will not vote
you! … Politicians do not see any moral ground to arrest them.
On the contrary, politicians work closely with them and assist them with
their problems. One of the most important local politicians, who was using
the Masai as a day-to-day campaign team and who used them in drafting
his election manifesto, argued: ‘ It is our work to help them and connect
them, and help them outside of the judicial process. So I would go to the
police and I would tell them: these people have no other option, we need
to re-educate them, we should bring them awareness. And we would agree
on this ’ (Local politician 2006 int.). By supporting particular politicians,
the Masai hope to inﬂuence policy, not only on miraa, but also on broader
issues aﬀecting them or other marginal urban groups. Moreover, the
Masai hope that once a politician is elected, he will not only tolerate their
business, but also support them and make use of their services and goods.
To some extent this already happens, in that the Masai organise the se-
curity and management of several politicians’ houses in the area ; and the
politicians strongly rely on the services of the fuel smugglers and boda boda
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taxis. They also receive ﬁnancial and material support from these
politicians : individual Masai can approach the politicians with their
individual problems such as hospital costs or school fees. Politicians have
also introduced them to micro-ﬁnance activities or training such as brick-
making.
Conﬁscation in this situation becomes almost farcical, in that sellers and
consumers are often informed about security agency raids (by government
agencies or politicians) ; while government agencies carry out these raids
because they are obliged to (by the local councils) but ﬁrst inform the
Masai. A good example of this was the reintroduction of the Special Police
Constables (SPCs) before the 2006 elections. They were mobilised for the
elections ; and as a kind of refresher training, they had to smoke out the
cannabis and miraa activities in town. Through their many governmental
connections, the Masai were informed about this plan, and easily escaped
arrest. Only a few non-aﬃliated consumers were arrested while the actual
Masai were left untouched. It shows how these arrests were only a
smokescreen: the SPCs carried out these raids because it was a national
order, while the key actors (the Masai group) were left untouched.
Through their contacts with local politicians and other governmental ﬁg-
ures, the Masai rely on insider knowledge in the construction of local
governance and the regulation of violence.
These patrimonial relations are highly beneﬁcial to both politicians (and
government actors in general) and the Masai : they relieve the state of the
cost of providing security and garner support for politicians. In return,
politicians make sure the Masai’s illegal activities are tolerated. Yet such
patrimonial relations also have their downside: as argued above, they
reduce accountability, and permit crimes committed outside town. The
relationship between the politicians and Masai can also be considered
rather problematic : by cooperating with the Masai as a local vigilante
force, and assisting in handing over thieves to the local authorities, the
politicians try to gain respect from their constituencies (cf. Heald 1986),
but at the same time may share the ‘ spoils ’ in a sort of protection racket, in
which many people are left out. Moreover, as going against the Masai is
not useful from an electoral point of view, politicians do not constitute a
‘check’ against potential malpractices of the Masai, which further con-
tributes to the reduced accountability of the group.
: : :
The recent literature on vigilantes highlights how these groupings operate
on a sliding scale from ‘order’ to ‘disorder’, and from the defence of
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public to more private interests. In the introduction, it was asked why
vigilantes contribute either to a social order, or to crime. The case of the
Masai demonstrates that this is not necessarily an either/or question, but
that social order and crime may coexist : they are a criminal gang of illegal
drug traﬃckers, who extend their initial private security/protection func-
tion towards public community interests and so become ‘vigilance actors ’.
Firstly, the literature on vigilance proves useful in analysing how the Masai
contribute to order and public authority in Bwera town, as it highlights the
importance of the relationship with the wider institutional environment in
contributing to (dis)order. Secondly, the Masai contribute to order in one
place (Bwera), while doing exactly the opposite outside the town, because
their vigilance activities are primarily informed by self-interest, in order to
allow their criminal activities to continue. In sum, they can be considered
a criminal gang which manages to strike a balance between private and
public concerns: the Masai continue their private criminal concerns, while
contributing to order within the community of Bwera town.
With regard to the ﬁrst ﬁnding, the Masai contribute to the shaping of
public authority within Bwera town. Central to this is an on-going nego-
tiation between the Masai on the one hand and local government auth-
orities and politicians on the other. Public authority is negotiated between
these two actors : this process (or ‘ﬁguration’) produces a range of rules and
codes which must be respected for this negotiation to continue, and which
are central to the production of governance in the town. A basic underlying
premise in this ‘negotiated reality ’ is that the Masai form an (ambiguous)
illegal entity. They are treated and perceived this way by the authorities,
and also by the Masai themselves. This situation informs the continuous
negotiation with the local authorities : the Masai have to respect certain
basic rules, otherwise their activities would simply no longer be tolerated.
First and most obviously, these basic rules are materially/ﬁnancially
mediated. As explained above, security agencies beneﬁt ﬁnancially
from khat activities, as they receive regular bribes from the Masai. In fact,
security agents are very much part of the miraa ‘complex’, in that there are
always security agents (police, Local Defence Units, Special Police
Constables and so on) hanging around the Synagogi, chewing mairungi,
accepting petty bribes and even actively participating in the author’s
discussions on miraa. A second rule which they must respect is that they
cannot overcrowd the Synagogi, or they will be arrested by local auth-
orities.21 Thirdly, a golden rule is that the Masai cannot engage in criminal
activities within the town. If they were to do so, the security agencies would
have to break the fragile equilibrium and end their activities. The Masai
therefore play an important role in controlling crime within the town.
312 KR I S TO F T I T E C A
Engagement in criminal activities outside the town and across the bor-
der does not disturb this equilibrium, as it allows the local authorities to
turn a blind eye to this. This would be impossible if the Masai committed
these crimes within the town. There are however certain areas in which
the Masai cannot engage. Grave oﬀences such as murder are for example
not the domain of the group. If a murder is committed, they cannot (and
do not want to) pass any judgement. Neither do they use their internal
mechanisms of conﬂict resolution if one of their members has committed a
grave oﬀence such as murder, but leave the case to the police. Security as a
public good within Bwera town is therefore negotiated and provided both
by the state institutions and the Masai. Each actor has its responsibilities.
These responsibilities are informal, but are nevertheless very clear for
both sides : whereas the Masai are the most important actor for ‘minor’
criminal oﬀences, grave cases are left to the governmental security agen-
cies. The Masai are therefore similar to what Lund (Lund 2006a, 2006b)
calls ‘ twilight institutions ’, defying clear-cut state/society public/private
distinctions, institutions which are not part of government, which are not
even considered legal – yet which exercise major public authority func-
tions. This is particularly the case in the ﬁeld of security and justice, where
the Masai have ‘certain forms of institutionalization and formalization
of the exercise of authority alluding to state, law and the bureaucracy,
encoded in oﬃcial language and often exercised with the paraphernalia of
modern statehood’ (Lund 2006a: 679). The regulation of violence within
the public space of Bwera town can therefore be seen as a ‘ functional
oligopoly’, with a ‘ﬂuctuating number of partly competing, partly co-
operating actors of violence of diﬀerent quality. In this context, ruling is
based on a mixture of real repression and permanent readiness to nego-
tiate ’ (Mehler 2004: 2).
The second main point of the article concerns the criminal character of
the organisation, which needs some further consideration. As argued in
the introduction, the micro-politics of vigilance involves protecting mem-
bers of the community within its boundaries and taking action against any
threats to it. The Masai certainly do this. The protected ‘community’ is
not only Bwera town, where they are considered a community police force
by the inhabitants, but also the ‘community’ of cross-border traders,
where they undertake similar actions to protect the property rights of
smugglers. However, when analysing the Masai’s overall activities, one
can only conclude that they are primarily a criminal organisation: they
threaten ‘their ’ community, in particular the cross-border traders, whom
they force to work with them. The main explanation as to why they do not
commit similar acts against the Bwera population can be explained in
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terms of the ‘ﬁguration’ in which they are embedded in town: as they are
perceived to be ‘ illegal ’ (or rather illegitimate) drug users, they put a lot of
eﬀort in countering this image by tackling crime within and outside the
organisation. This was particularly the case during the ADF insurgency,
when there was a higher degree of urban criminality, and they ﬁlled a
popular need for anti-crime measures. This community policing role,
together with their important political function, in turn allows them to
continue their illegal activities. Their vigilance activities can therefore be
seen as an instrument of self-preservation, which gives them the necessary
support of the local population and politicians: by remaining ‘embedded’
in this ﬁguration, they protect themselves. Political protection, above
all else, enables them to continue their activities. In sum, the speciﬁc
‘ﬁgurations ’ within Bwera town empower certain groups in society and
prevent the eruption of political chaos, but allow organised crime to con-
tinue, with regard both to smuggling activities and to general criminality
outside the town.
N O T E S
1. Field research was conducted from March to June 2005, September to December 2006 and in
October 2008. This was carried out through a combination of observation and semi-structured and
open interviews. The research focused not only on the Masai, but also on other key actors in the town
and district such as the district and urban authorities, local politicians, security agencies, traders,
elders, national politicians, family members and neighbours of the Masai, and so on.
2. For an analysis of the negotiation of public order in a situation of war (in eastern Congo) see
Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers 2004a, 2004b; Raeymaekers 2007.
3. Timothy Raeymaekers suggested this point. He uses the term ﬁgurations to analyse order in
situations where tensions exist between various regions and institutions which want to establish
domination over society; and in particular to analyse the ‘ transboundary ﬁgurations’ of a group of
Congolese traders (Raeymaekers 2007).
4. This was a major diﬃculty throughout the ﬁeld research. For example, at times he would forbid
me and my research assistant to continue with our research, physically threatening us. This was
particularly the case when he (and other members) had consumed too much drugs (marijuana, miraa,
alcohol, fuel fumes, and so on). After a few days, he cooled down, which made contact with him and
the Masai possible again.
5. For example, during the period of ﬁeldwork, a younger Masai who refused to get banja (cannabis)
for an older Masai was severely beaten.
6. The majority of non-consumers do not seem aware of the diﬀerence between cannabis and
miraa.
7. This is beyond their negotiation skills.
8. This movement arose as a result of the marginalisation of Muslims in post-colonial Uganda, and
in particular during the period following the overthrow of Amin (1979), when Muslims were actively
persecuted. It soon became a key political pressure group, both within the Ugandan Muslim com-
munity (against ‘ intellectual dishonesty’) and the Ugandan political landscape, where it became an
opposition political movement acting against the marginalisation of Muslims. In 1991, the Ugandan
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council, a rival Muslim group. This
led to a radicalisation of the movement, which from then on saw the institution of an Islamic state as
the only possible protection against the marginalisation of Muslims and state interference in their
aﬀairs (Simba-Kayunga 1994). The violent struggle between the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council
and the Tabliq movement saw a number of senior Tabliq members put into prison. After their release
in 1993, they ﬂed to western Uganda, where they started organising themselves militarily. This led to
314 KR I S TO F T I T E C A
the formal constitution of the ADF. An attack by the Ugandan army forced them to ﬂee to Bunia,
eastern Congo, where they attracted remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
(NALU) and the Rwenzururu movement (Titeca & Vlassenroot in prep).
9. One particularly notorious attack was in June 1998 on Kicwamba Technical Institute in
Kabarole district, in which about 80 students were killed and 200 civilians (mostly children) were
abducted (Achieng 1999 in Hovil & Werker 2005: 13).
10. Oﬃcial ﬁgures for Kasese District from document provided by Secretary for Disaster
Preparedness on 22.11.2006.
11. A fear conﬁrmed by the reactivated presence of the ADF from the second half of 2006 onwards.
12. An astonishing 63% of the land of Kasese district (or 1,834.73 km2) is occupied by government
projects (national parks, refugee settlements, government farms), leaving only 37% of the land for the
population to settle (OPM 2001). In combination with the very high population pressure of Kasese
district (a fertility rate of 7.4%, doubling the population every 23 to 25 years, whereas the national
average is about 33 to 35 years), this makes the situation ‘potentially explosive’ (ibid. : 11).
13. Carrier (2007: 225) uses a similar argument with regard to Kenyan miraa farmers and traders,
who are ‘keen to counter such a bad press, ﬁghting against the notion that Miraa is not respectable ’.
14. The Masai are the only group in town with an elaborate organisational structure. This eﬀective
structure is a sine qua non for the Masai to continue their illicit activities : it allows them to control their
members and ﬁght the popular notion that they are a group of ‘ thugs’ and ‘drug addicts ’. Other
groups do not have this need, as their activities are not perceived as illicit.
15. For solving issues of theft, minor payments are expected. Depending on the case and the
ﬁnancial situation of the person, they receive between UGX 5,000 and 25,000 (US $3.1–15.3).
Sometimes they punish the thief themselves, but if the case is too serious (for example murder) or if the
thief is resisting too much, they take him to the police.
16. The Masai tribunal is also preferred to the LCI court, which is quite exceptional in Uganda; see
Baker 2004.
17. Kate Meagher suggested this point.
18. A similar tactic can be seen for large-scale smugglers in north-western Uganda, who push out
small-scale smugglers who choose not to pay for their protection services of business, by making sure
their goods are conﬁscated (Titeca in prep.).
19. Masai leader Jamali 2006 int.
20. As Lund (2006a: 679) argues : ‘ In excluding the ‘‘bad boys’’ from our analytical lens, we
develop ‘‘ tunnel vision’’ and lose perspective. The unruly, the un-civil and the ones who are capricious
and hard to nail down are just as signiﬁcant in local politics as more angelic organizations. Moreover,
such groups are generally more recalcitrant, vociferous and outright ﬂamboyant than benign volun-
tary associations patronized by benevolent donors, and they lead us to identify tensions in society. ’
21. Concretely, when too many people are seen hanging around the Synagogi, the sub-county
council orders the police to arrest them because they are considered a security threat.
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Masai member 2, Bwera, Kasese, 21.10.2006.
Masai member 3, Bwera, Kasese, 2.11.2006.
Motorcycle taxi driver, Bwera, Kasese, 23.10.2006.
Oﬃcer in charge (OC), town police station, Bwera, Kasese, 28.11.2006.
Police oﬃcer, Bwera, Kasese, 26.11.2006.
Police security oﬃcer, Bwera, Kasese, 19.11.2006.
Senior security oﬃcer, Bwera, Kasese, 10.09.2006.
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